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THE LAY VIEW OF WHAT "DISABILITY" MEANS MUST
GIVE WAY TO WHAT CONGRESS SAYS IT MEANS:
INFERTILITY AS A "DISABILITY" UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
"To the lay eye, they hardly seem disabled, yet they have a
'disability' within the statutory definition."'
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed into law the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).2 Finding that
"individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms of discrimination,"' Congress enacted the ADA to "assure
equality of opportunity" for the disabled.4 The ADA has been
heralded as the "20th century emancipation proclamation"5 for
an estimated forty-three million disabled Americans,6 prohibit-
ing discrimination in employment,' public services, transporta-
tion,' and public accommodations.9 The ADA further mandates
the provision of certain telecommumcations services and televi-
1. Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(describing individuals with lugh blood pressure).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 and 47 U.S.C.). For an excellent treatment of the history of the ADA, see
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. A
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 9-62
(1990) [hereinafter A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994).
4. Id. § 12101(a)(8).
5. 136 CONG. REC. S9529 (daily ed. July 11, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
For a histoncal perspective of discrimination against the disabled, see Elizabeth C.
Morn, Note, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Social Integration Through
Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189, 192-95 (1990).
6. See DON FERSH & PETER W. THOMAS, COMPLYING WITH THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, A GUIDEBOOK FOR MANAGEMENT AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 7
(1993) (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
MEDICAL REHABILITATION RESEARCH (1990)). Fersh and Thomas reveal some surpns-
mg statistics: one in seven Americans has a disability; 22 million are hearing im-
paired; 16.4 million have heart disease; 13 to 14 million have diabetes; and 5.7
million are mentally retarded. Id. at 8.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
8. Id. §§ 12131-12134, 12141-12150, 12161-12165.
9. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
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sion advertisements. 10
Despite its laudable goals, the ADA has received much criti-
cism." Business organizations view the ADA as "another gov-
ernmental intrusion into their workplace" 12 and fear "an on-
slaught of costly litigation."" Critics also argue that inherent
vagueness lies in the ADA's definition of the term "disability," 4
allowing a "parade of absurdities"5 to come before the courts.
10. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. V 1993).
11. Consider this excerpt from an article added to the House record by Rep. De-
Lay before Congress passed the ADA:
With its loose construction, [and] vague language the ADA bill openly
invites a massive wave of litigation, thus establishing the "Lawyers [sic]
Full Employment Act."...
Congress still hasn't learned that you cannot mandate equality. If
Congress passes [the ADA], it will impose economic hardships on busi-
ness and industry and their employees which they can ill afford and will
put truly disabled individuals in a disadvantaged and adversarial posi-
tion. ADA hurts, not helps, the most vulnerable elements of society.
. . . [P]lacing stifling requirements on businesses could foster severe
hostility and resentment against the truly disabled.
136 CONG. REc. H2322 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. DeLay) (quoting
Maiselle D. Shortley, Disabling the Disabled); see also 135 CONG. REC. E3064 (daily
ed. Sept. 18, 1989) (statement of Rep. Shumway) ("[Tihe bill is a swamp of impre-
cise language; it will mostly benefit lawyers who will cash in on the litigation that
will force judges to, in effect, write the real law.").
Just five years after its enactment, the ADA came under criticism for not meet-
ing its goal of increasing employment opportunities for the disabled. See Jay
Matthews, A Disappointing Disabilities Law: Goal of Helping Severely Disabled Find
Jobs 'Has Not Been Met at All,' STAR-TRIB., (Minneapolis) Apr. 29, 1995, at 4A. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's statistics show that of 39,927 com-
plaints filed through December 1994, just 12.1% of the complaints were made by
people suffering from such conditions as spinal cord injuries and neurological prob-
lems, the conditions frequently mentioned during the ADA's initial consideration. Id.
See also Bob Dole, Are We Keeping America's Promises to People With Disabilities?,
79 IoWA L. REv. 925, 928 (1994) (citing statistics showing that employment of the
disabled following the passage of the ADA has actually decreased from 33% in 1986
to 31% in 1994).
12. THOMAS D. SCHNEiD, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABmITES ACT. A PRACTCAL
GUIDE FOR MANAGERS v (1992).
13. Id.
14. See Larry M. Schumaker, The Top Ten Issues Under the ADA, 50 J. MO. B.
283 (1994) (describing the ADA's definition of disability as inherently vague and
stating that "[bly design, the statute and the EEOC's implementing regulations
permit the courts to decide 'borderline' issues on a case-by-case basis").
15. James Bovard, The Disabilities Act's Parade of Absurdities, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 1995, at A16. Mr. Bovard discussed numerous ADA claims to support his
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The ADA defines a "disability" as a "physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more.., major life
activities."" Before the ADA's passage, business representa-
tives urged Congress to include a list of disabilities in the statu-
tory provisions rather than utilizing the broad definition.
7
Many business owners deemed it "simply ridiculous" to expect
them to know which disabilities would fall within the broad stat-
utory definition." Business owners claimed that unless Con-
gress included a comprehensive list of disabilities, they would
not know "if they [had] guessed right or wrong until a complaint
[was] filed and a decision rendered." 9
Despite these arguments, Congress declined to include a list
of disabilities in the ADA, finding it impossible to ensure the
"comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the
fact that new disorders may develop in the future."0 Since the
passage of the ADA, however, interpretive problems have, never-
opinion that the ADA fosters absurd results. Id. For example, he cited one case in
which a telephone operator sued her ex-employer alleging that "chronic lateness syn-
drome" was a disability. Id. Mr. Bovard cited another case in which a Boston Uni-
versity professor, fired for sexually assaulting a female professor, alleged that he
was mentally handicapped under the ADA because prescription drugs "loosened his
inhibitions." Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
17. John J. Motley III of the National Federation of Independent Business voiced
his concerns before the House Judiciary Committee:
At the very least, a list of disabilities, with a layman's description of each
disability, should be included in the bill. When necessary, it can be
amended to add or delete disabilities as technology and research bring us
closer to understanding and addressing various disabilities .... But with-
out such a list to provide guidance, business owners will not know what
is covered and will never be safe from the threat of litigation. And indi-
viduals with less well known disabilities will never know if they can
expect accommodation.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1989) (statement of John J. Motley III, Director of Federal Gov-
ernmental Relations, National Federation of Independent Business) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter HEARINGS].
18. Id. at 1913.
19. Id.
20. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.CAN. 303, 333.
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theless, arisen. Unresolved issues include: what level of obesity
is a disability;" what behavioral disorders, such as phobias and
anxiety disorders, are covered;" and when a past drug addic-
tion is a disability."
Two recent cases addressing the issue of whether infertility is
a disability likewise illustrate the courts' struggles with the
ADA's definitional framework. In Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.'
and Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc.,' the plaintiffs contend-
ed that infertility was a disability under the ADA and that their
employers fired them because of their disability, in contraven-
tion of the ADA.' 6 In Pacourek, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss the ADA claim, concluding that the plaintiffs allegations
"clearly state[d]" a claim within the ADA's definition of disabili-
ty.' Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
21. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995) (noting that "except in rare circumstances,
obesity is not considered a disabling impairment"). But see William C. Taussig, Note,
Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island Department of
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Dis-
ability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 B.C.
L. REV. 927 (1994) (arguing that obesity in general, rather than just morbid obesity,
is a disability); Steven M. Ziolkowski, Case Comment, The Status of Weight-Based
Employment Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Cook v.
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 74 B.U. L.
REv. 667, 684-85 (1994) (arguing that obesity fits the definition of disability under
the ADA and calling for the EEOC to amend its regulations to resolve the existing
ambiguity).
22. See John M. Casey, Comment, From Agoraphobia to Xenophobia: Phobias
and Other Anxiety Disorders Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 381, 383 (1994) (calling for the EEOC to issue definitive guidance on
what constitutes a mental disability under the ADA).
23. See Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079, 1084 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs drug use was recent enough that it constituted use even though
he had successfully completed a rehabilitation program); McDaniel v. Mississippi
Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.D. Miss.), affd, 74 F.3d 1238 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a person who participates in a supervised drug rehabilita-
tion program and who has not had drugs for several weeks still is not an otherwise
qualified employee).
24. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denial of defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
25. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), (granting of defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgement), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
26. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1397; Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 242-44.
27. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1404-05.
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of Louisiana soundly dismissed Ms. Zatarain's ADA claim on
summary judgment, refusing to engage in what it viewed as "a
conscious expansion of the law." '
While Zatarain and Pacourek differ over whether infertility is
a disability under the ADA, the significance of the infertility-dis-
ability debate is not clear until one looks at the remedies re-
quired under the ADA. The ADA mandates "reasonable accom-
modation" of an individual with a disability.29 Recognition of
infertility as a disability, therefore, has broad ramifications for
millions of infertile couples. If infertility is considered a disabili-
ty, an employer may be required to "accommodate" the employ-
ee.30 "Reasonable accommodation" could include permitting a re-
duced or modified work schedule to enable the employee to take
time off from work to undergo the countless procedures necessary
for some types of fertility treatments."' Without this protection,
an employee who is desperately attempting to conceive a child
may face discriminatory termination because of her absences.
Perhaps even more significant is the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission's (EEOC) determination that the ADA
prohibits disability-based discrimination in employer-provided
health insurance.32 An example of a disability-based distinction
is one that singles out a particular disability, such as deafness,
and excludes, caps, or limits coverage for that disability." Fer-
28. Zatarain, 881 F. Supp at 243.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). If an employee or applicant belongs to the
protected class, an employer must offer the individual "reasonable accommodation"
that will enable the employee or applicant to perform the essential functions of the
job, unless the "reasonable accommodation" will cause the employer to suffer "undue
hardship." See id.
30. See id. § 12111(4) (defining "employee" under the ADA).
31. See id. § 12111(9)(B) (stating that reasonable accommodation may include
part-time or modified work schedules).
32. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIN, INTERIM ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS wrTH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
TO DISABILrIy-BASED DISTINCTIONS IN EMPLOYER PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE,
EEOC NOTICE N-915.002 at 2 (1993) [hereinafter INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE],
reprinted in U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 app. E. (1995) [hereinafter EEOC
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM]. The EEOC enforces the ADA's employment provi-
sions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1995).
33. See INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 7-8. The ADA does
1996] 375
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tility treatment caps or exclusions may, thus, violate the ADA if
infertility were considered a disability.'
Given the high cost of some infertility treatments, insurance
coverage is a significant issue. According to some estimates,
many couples using assisted reproductive technology incur costs
as high as $31,000 per cycle, 5 with no guarantee of conceiving
a child. In-vitro fertilization (IVF), a high-tech option, can cost
from $6000 to $50,000 per live birth." Although Americans
spent approximately $1 billion on infertility services in 1987,"7
individuals desiring to conceive nevertheless opted not to follow
forty-one percent of recommended infertility procedures because
of the high cost of the services.38 If the ADA prohibited infertili-
ty treatment limits in employer-provided health insurance,
many couples who could not previously have afforded infertility
services may seek treatment because the restructured insurance
coverage would make the treatment financially feasible.
This Note explores the infertility-disability debate and propos-
es that the EEOC adopt a position recognizing that the broad
language of the ADA encompasses infertility as a disability. As a
starting point, this Note briefly describes the history of the ADA
provide, however, that employers can establish or observe the terms of a health in-
surance plan, including terms or provisions based on a disability, so long as the
plan is "bona fide" and not being used as a form of "subterfuge" to evade the ADA's
purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c); see INTERIM ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 32,
at 7-8.
34. See EEOC's Interim Guidance on the Application of the ADA to Health Plans
Bears Little Resemblance to the Statute, 2 ERISA LITIG. REP. 17 (Aug. 1993), avail-
able in Westlaw, ERISALR Database (concluding that employers may face great ex-
pense if limiting fertility treatment is found to be a disability-based distinction). The
prohibition on disability-based exclusions was at issue in Krauel u. Iowa Methodist
Medical Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995), in which the plaintiff contended
that her employer's insurance plan's exclusion of infertility treatments violated the
ADA. Id. at 104. The court held that infertility was not a disability and therefore
the infertility exclusion was not a disability-based distinction. Id. at 108.
35. Rhonda S. Tischler, Note, Infertility: A Forgotten Disability, 41 WAYNE L.
REv. 249, 254 (1994).
36. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56, 58. Some
estimates approach $100,000 for standard IVF. Larry Thompson, Fertility with Less
Fuss, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 79.
37. Tischler, supra note 35, at 255.
38. Id. at 251.
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and the requirements for asserting a disability under Title I.
The second section discusses the various causes and treatments
of infertility,4" while the third section examines the Zatarain
and Pacourek decisions.41  Finally, this Note argues that
Zatarain was incorrectly decided and that infertility does, in-
deed, fall within the ADA's broad definition of a disability.42
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
History
Except for the Air Carrier Access Act of 198643 and the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988,"4 no federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws protected disabled persons in the private sector before
the enactment of the ADA in 1990. 45 Although the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 197346 prohibits discrimination against the disabled
in the private sector, only those programs or activities receiving
federal financial assistance fall within its scope.47 Before the
ADA, therefore, most private employers could discriminate
against disabled persons with impunity.4"
In 1986, after recognizing the necessity for a comprehensive
federal law to prevent discrimination against the disabled, Con-
39. See infra notes 43-106 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 107-82 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 183-232 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 233-331 and accompanying text.
43. Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§
1301, 1374(c) (1988)) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 41705 (1996)) (prohibiting dis-
crimination by air carriers against persons with disabilities).
44. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
2341-2342 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting discrimination against
the disabled in the sale or rental of private housing).
45. A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 2, at 26.
46. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C.).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
48. See A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 2, at 26-28. Twenty-five per-
cent of disabled individuals responded in a 1986 telephone poll that they had en-
countered job discrimination. Id. Forty-seven percent of those who were unemployed
stated that employers failed to recognize that they could hold a full-time job despite
their disabilities. Id. Seventy-five percent of business managers interviewed in a
1987 telephone poll reported that disabled persons "'often encounter job discrimina-
tion from employers.'" Id. at 28.
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gress directed the National Council on Disability to present
legislative recommendations "to enhance the productivity and
quality of life of people with disabilities."49 The Council's report,
Toward Independence, included forty-five legislative proposals,
including a proposal for a "'single comprehensive bill.... The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1986'."5 Two years later, the
Council published a follow-up report and presented a draft ADA
bill to Congress.5' Subsequently, both the Senate and the
House introduced ADA bills, but both died in committee.52
United in their goal to "bringU people with mental and physical
disabilities into the mainstream of American life,"53 Democrats
and Republicans co-sponsored identical bills in the House and the
Senate in 1989."4 Despite bipartisan support55 and a ringing
endorsement from President Bush,55 the ADA had a "bumpy
road to final passage."57 Major debates erupted over whether
punitive damages could be assessed against employers who vio-
lated the Act, whether the Act should be phased in for small em-
ployers, and whether various types of physical, emotional, and
mental impairments should be classified as disabilities. 8
While debating which impairments should be considered dis-
abilities, Senator Armstrong of Colorado argued that the term
"disability" should be clearly defined; specifically, he wanted the
bill to list the precise categories of disabilities to be covered.59
49. Id. at 29.
50. Id. (quoting NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ToWARD INDEPENDENCE 18 (1986)).
51. Id. at 30.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 35.
54. S. 933, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 2273, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
55. See A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 2, at 37.
56. See id. at 37-38.
57. Id. at 37.
58. See id. at 36-62.
59. 135 CONG. REC. S10,772 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong). "I think the proper way to proceed . . . is . . . to list the specific pro-
tected categories." Id.
Senator Armstrong continued his objections even after voting for the ADA:
I voted for the ADA with some reluctance. I was reluctant to vote for
the bill because it will create an adversarial relationship between people
with disabilities and the proprietors of small businesses, because its def-
inition of disabilities is vague, and because it may be used to advance
[Vol. 38:371378
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The National Federation of Independent Business likewise ar-
gued that because the bill's proponents often said that Congress
intended the ADA to cover over 900 separate categories of physi-
cal and mental disorders, employers should not be burdened
with a vague definition of disability."0
Although unwilling to list all the disabilities covered by the
Act, Congress did specifically exclude some conditions from its
coverage. Homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexual-
ism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disor-
ders not resulting from physical impairments, and sexual behav-
ior disorders were excluded, as were compulsive gambling, klep-
tomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from current illegal drug use.6 ' With the exception of
current illegal drug use," no other diseases, illnesses, condi-
tions, or disorders, besides those listed above, were expressly
excluded from the ADA's definition of disability.
The disagreements over certain provisions notwithstanding,
political agendas that have nothing to do with the rights of handicapped
people.
136 CONG. REC. S9694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Armstrong). Oth-
ers expressed fears similar to Senator Armstrong's: "This bill is too vague in its
definition of a disability and too inflexible in its mandates for me to support [it]."
136 CONG. REC. E1774-75 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Rep. Craig). See
also 136 CONG. REC. H2621 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement, of Rep. Cox)
(stating that "[t]he definition of who is disabled is in large measure left to the
courts."); Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on Small Busi-
ness, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1990) (statement of Rep. DeLay) (stating that: "[tihe
definition of disability must be clarified. The intent of the ADA is to protect the
disabled. The bill now covers more than 900 unknown disabilities. This broad appli-
cation includes drug addicts, alcoholics, people with contagious diseases and individu-
als with 'voluntary' conditions such as being overweight.").
60. See HEARINGS, supra note 17, at 1913-14 (statement of John J. Motley III,
Director of Federal Governmental Relations, National Federation of Independent
Business).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994) (codifying these sections).
62. Individuals who are "currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs" are not
considered disabled. Id. § 12114(a). Nevertheless, Congress recognized that past drug
addiction sometimes forms the basis for unfair discrimination. See id § 12114(b). As
such, if the individual no longer uses illegal drugs and participates in or successfully
completes a supervised drug rehabilitation program or "has otherwise been rehabili-
tated successfully," an employer may not discriminate on the basis of that person's
past drug use. Id. § 12114(b)(1)-(2).
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Congress passed the ADA and President Bush signed it into law
on July 26, 1990.3 Various provisions of the ADA received
staggered effective dates: Title I (employment) went into effect
July 26, 1992 for employers with 25 or more workers,' and on
July 26, 1994 for employers with 15 or more workers;65 most
provisions of Titles II (public services) and III (public accommo-
dations and services) became effective on January 26, 1992;66
and Title IV (telecommunications) requirements were to be ad-
hered to by July 26, 1993.67
What Is a "Disability" Under the ADA?
Although the ADA has a broad scope, covering discrimination
against the disabled in employment," public services and
transportation,69 public accommodations,7" and telecommuni-
cations services,71 this Note limits its discussion to the Title I
employment provisions.
Under Title I, an employer cannot discriminate against a
"qualified individual with a disability because of the disability"
with respect to "the hiring, advancement, or discharge of em-
ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."7 2 If the individual is
disabled, but can perform the "essential functions of the employ-
ment position," with or without "reasonable accommodation," the
individual is "qualified" and, therefore, protected, under the
ADA.7" A claimant, however, must first qualify as an "individu-
63. A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 2, at 35.
64. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A), 12111 note (1994).
65. Id.
66. See id. §§ 12131 note, 12161 note, 12181. note (1992).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (Supp. V 1993).
68. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
69. Id. §§ 12131-12134, 12141-12150, 12161-12165.
70. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
71. 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 221, 225, 611 (Supp. V 1993).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). For simplicity, this Note consistently uses the
term "employer" although § 12112(a) actually prohibits a "covered entity" from dis-
criminating. Id. A "covered entity" is "an employer, employment agency, labor organi-
zation, or joint labor-management committee." Id. § 12111(2).
73. Id. § 12111(8).
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al with a disability."74
An "individual with a disability" is an individual with "a phys-
ical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual."75 This definition
includes three prongs: (1) whether the asserted condition is a
physical or mental impairment, (2) whether the impairment
affects one or more major life activities, and (3) whether the
major life activity is substantially limited by the impairment.76
Impairment
Although the ADA's substantive provisions do not define im-
pairment, EEOC implementing regulations define a physical or
mental impairment as:
[any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine; or [amny mental or psychological disorder,
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotion-
al or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.77
The regulations do not list any specific conditions that are
considered "per se" impairments.7" The legislative history re-
veals, however, that "orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing
impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, mul-
tiple sclerosis, infection with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus [HIVI, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness... drug addiction, and alcoholism" are the
74. Id.
75. Id. § 12102(2)(A). The term "individual with a disability" also includes those
who have a "record of' or are "regarded as having" an impairment. Id. §
12102(2)(B)-(C). Under these two provisions, an individual who is not currently dis-
abled is nonetheless treated as being disabled because either the individual in the
past suffered from a condition that was disabling (i.e., a former cancer patient) or is
erroneously believed by others to be disabled (i.e., an employee rumored to be HIV-
infected). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k),(l) (1995).
76. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-j) (1995).
77. Id. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2).
78. See id.
1996]
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types of conditions that the ADA was intended to cover. 9
As an additional aid in determining what conditions are im-
pairments, EEOC guidelines emphasize that the origin of the
impairment must be physiological in its nature:
[Slimple physical characteristics ... such as eye or hair color,
lefthandedness, or height or weight within a normal range,
are not impairments. A physical condition that is not the
result of a physiological disorder, such as pregnancy, or a
predisposition to a certain disease would not be an impair-
ment. Similarly, personality traits such as poor judgment,
quick temper or irresponsible behavior, are not themselves
impairments. Environmental, cultural, or economic disadvan-
tages, such as lack of education or a prison record also are
not impairments.0
Notwithstanding these exclusions, almost any physiological or
mental ailment can meet the ADA's definition of impairment.
Hypothetically, the common cold may qualify as an impairment
because it affects the respiratory system.8 ' Determining wheth-
er the individual has a physical or mental impairment, however,
is only the first step under the ADA. Although a person may be
impaired, to rise to the level of a disability the impairment must
substantially limit one or more "major life activities." 2
Major Life Activities
The ADA does not define "major life activity," but the EEOC
regulations define "major life activities" as "those basic activities
that the average person in the general population can perform
with little or no difficulty." 3 The EEOC regulations continue by
stating that, "[m]ajor life activities include caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
79. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20, at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 333.
80. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 32, at H1-2.
81. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995) (describing temporary, nonchronic conditions,
such as influenza, as impairments).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995) (adopting the definition of "major life activities"
from the regulations at 34 C.F.R. § 104, implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
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breathing, learning, and working." In addition, activities such
as reading," sitting,86  standing," lifting," and reaching 9
are major life activities. A House report also lists "participating
in community activities" as a major life activity."
It is important to note that the list of major life activities is
not all-inclusive; the activities listed are merely examples."
The EEOC has recognized that others may be included as the
case law develops.2 In fact, the. EEOC issued new guidance in
March 1995, adding "[miental and emotional processes such as
thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others" to the list
of major life activities. 3
Substantially Limits
Once a claimant establishes that she suffers from an impair-
ment that in some manner affects a major life activity, for the
impairment to rise to the level of a "disability," it must "substan-
tially limit" one or more of the affected major life activities. 4
EEOC regulations define the term "substantially limits"95 and
list several factors requiring analysis to determine whether an
impairment is substantially limiting. 6
In essence, the individual must be less able to perform the
major life activity than is "the average person in the general
84. Id.
85. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMON, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANU-
AL, EEOC ORDER 915,002, SECTION 902, DEFINITION OF THE TERM "DISABILITY" 902-
15 (1995) [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL], reprinted in EEOC TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 32, at app. E.




90. See H.R. REP. NO. 485, supra note 20, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 334.
91. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995) (noting that "[tihis list is not exhaustive.").
92. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 85, at 902-14 ("In most cases,
courts have simply stated that an impaired activity is a major life activity.").
93. Id. at 902-15.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
95. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (1995).
96. Id. § 1630.2()(2).
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population... ."" Determining whether the impairment is sub-
stantially limiting requires case-by-case analysis; thus, the issue
is whether the impairment is substantially limiting with refer-
ence to the specific individual, rather than to afflicted people in
general." Specific factors requiring consideration are: "(i) [tlhe
nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or ex-
pected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [tlhe permanent or
long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term im-
pact.., resulting from the impairment."9
Under the ADA the impairment need not limit the major life
activity of working."0 So long as the impairment substantially
limits a major life activity, the claimant's ability or inability to
work is of no consequence.'0 ' Hypothetically, then, an employee
may suffer from dyslexia which substantially limits her ability
to read, but if the employee's work does not require her to read,
she is nevertheless "disabled" under the ADA. In sum, an em-
ployer cannot discriminate against an employee because of a
disability regardless of whether the disability affects the
employee's ability to work.
Employers' Obligations Under the ADA
Reasonable accommodation is the key nondiscrimination
requirement of the ADA."2 The requires employers to make
"reasonable accommodation" to the known physical or mental
limitations of the qualified disabled individual, unless the em-
ployer would suffer "undue hardship" in providing the accommo-
dation.0 3
Reasonable accommodation may include making existing facil-
97. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
98. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 85, at 902-15 to 902-16.
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1995).
100. See id. § 1630.2(j) ("If an individual is substantially limited in any other ma-
jor life activity, no determination should be made as to whether the individual is
substantially limited in working.").
101. See id.
102. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 32, at III-1.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). "Undue hardship" is defined as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense" after considering factors such as the over-
all financial resources of the employer, the size of the business, and the nature and
cost of the accommodation. Id. § 12111(10).
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ities "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities."'0 4 An employer may also be required to restruc-
ture a job so as to allow a part-time or modified work schedule
or to reassign'the employee to a vacant position that the dis-
abled employee can perform.0 5 Further discussion of these re-
quirements is beyond this Note's limited scope. For the purposes
of this Note it is sufficient to say that much debate exists re-
garding what constitutes a "reasonable accommodation" or "un-
due hardship."0 6
UNDERSTANDING INFERTILITY: CAUSES AND TREATMENT
A thorough discussion of the causes of infertility and the vari-
ous treatment options is well beyond the scope of this Note.
Nonetheless, to appreciate fully the plaintiffs' position in
Zatarain and Pacourek, this topic warrants a brief discussion.
Causes of Infertility
Defined as the "inability of a couple to conceive after 12
months of unprotected intercourse," 7 infertility has been cate-
gorized as "a disease, a disorder, a disability, a handicap, an ill-
ness, a syndrome, a condition, as well as a condition caused by a
disease."' 8 Though estimates vary, approximately five million
Americans suffer from infertility."9 Some commentators have
104. Id. § 12111(9).
105. Id.
106. See Ren~e L. Cyr, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job
Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV.
1237, 1238 (1992) (arguing that "by explicitly identifying job reassignment as one
form of reasonable accommodation required by the ADA, Congress has- mandated
that all employers must reassign" disabled employees to vacant positions); Steven B.
Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial
Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 391, 398 (1995) (proposing a standard that clarifies the point "at which an
employer's obligation to accommodate reaches the level of undue hardship");
Schumaker, supra note 14, at 283-84 (discussing accommodation issues such as leave
of absence, job reassignment, and job restructuring).
107. JOHN YEH & MOLLY U. YEH, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFERTILITY 1 (1991).
108. Joel N. Ephross, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current Issues, 32
JURmETRICS J. 447, 449 (1992).
109. See Joan Hamilton, Infertility: What You Should Know, BUS. WK., Mar. 14,
1994, at 88; see generally Susan Caminiti, The Ordeal of Infertility, FORTUNE, Aug.
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concluded that "America today is in the midst of an infertility
epidemic.... .""'
Although infertility is generally "overlooked as a serious life
problem [and] ignored as a legitimate health issue,"" for an
infertile couple desiring to have children, it "exacts a terrible
emotional and physical toll.""' Infertility causes feelings of en-
vy as the couple watches others with small children."' Often,
feelings of frustration and lack of control envelop an infertile
couple as the desire to have children becomes all-consuming."4
"The inability to have a baby can turn a couple's life upside
down.... [and] test[] even the strongest marriages." 5
Although infertility is most often thought of as a woman's
problem, it affects men as well as women."6 Forty percent of
the total cases of infertility in the United States arise from prob-
lems with the female." "The male factor""' causes an addi-
tional forty percent."9 The remaining twenty percent of infer-
tility cases result from a combination of male and female
8, 1994, at 98 (discussing the medical, psychological, and social aspects of infertility
treatment).
As compared to the number of people with disabilities clearly within the scope
of the ADA, this number is quite high. For instance, 2 million people are deaf, 1
million are confined to wheelchairs, 1.6 million are missing an arm or a leg, less
than 1 million are legally blind, and an estimated 1 million are HIV-positive. FERSH
& THOMAS, supra note 6, at 8.
110. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 56.
111. Melissa R. O'Rourke, Comment, The Status of Infertility Treatments and In-
surance Coverage: Some Hopes and Frustrations, 37 S.D. L. REV. 343, 343 (1992)
(quoting Patricia Schroeder, Infertility and the World Outside, 49 FERTILITY & STE-
RILITY 765 (1988)).
112. Tischler, supra note 35, at 251.
113. See Caminiti, supra note 109, at 99.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See JOSEPH H. BELLINA & JOSLEEN WILSON, You CAN HAVE A BABY: EVERY-
THING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT FERTILITY 49 (1985); Hamilton, supra note 109,
at 88. Dr. Bellina and Ms. Wilson provide a comprehensive lay person's guide to in-
fertility. They devote a substantial portion of their book to describing the male and
female reproductive systems and detailing the causes of male and female infertility.
See BELLINA & WILSON, supra, at 3-96.
117. YEH & YEH, supra note 107, at 6-7.
118. See id. at 113.
119. Id. at 6-7.
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factors. 2
Very little is known about the "male factor."' Currently, the
identified causes of male infertility fall into three broad catego-
ries: (1) defects associated with poor sperm production, (2) block-
ages in the passageways that transport sperm, and (3) problems
concerning the deposit of sperm in the vaginal canal.'22
One of the most prominent causes of male infertility is varico-,
cele, a varicose vein of the testicle." Between thirty and forty
percent of all infertile men have a varicocele, which is believed
to cause overheating in the sperm production centers of the
testicles, either killing the sperm or resulting in the production
of immature or deformed sperm. 24 Approximately five percent
of infertile men have a blockage in the sperm transport system
caused by injuries, surgeries performed in early childhood, or
bacterial infections. 2 Male sexual dysfunction, such as impo-
tence caused by physical or psychological factors, can also cause
a couple's infertility.2 6
Female infertility is also attributable to numerous causes.
More than fifty percent of all women's fertility problems involve
a defect of the ovulatory system.' Most often the defect re-
sults in the ovaries' failure to produce the mature egg necessary
for successful conception.2 A mechanical obstruction or block-
age of the fallopian tubes also commonly causes female infertili-
ty. 9 Blockages inside the fallopian tubes can prevent sperm
and egg from uniting."' Partial blockages can entrap a fertil-
ized ovum and cause a tubal pregnancy."' Obstructions may
r~nl fin, n~nm±ri~t~ r iqPsqqP fhait r ia se~ carr of the
Id. at 7.
Id. at 113.
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ovaries and fallopian tubes."2 The incidence of infertility among
women who have endometriosis is nearly fifty percent.13
Endometriosis is not the only disease that results in scarring
of the fallopian tubes. The most common cause of scarring of the
fallopian tubes and of the reproductive organs is pelvic inflam-
matory disease (PID), which is almost always caused by sexually
transmitted bacteria." A single episode of PID presents a
woman with a fifteen percent risk of becoming infertile, and the
infertility rate increases with each subsequent infection.3 5 Af-
ter two PID infections, a fifty percent chance of infertility occurs;
after three infections, the risk increases to seventy-five per-
cent.
136
A number of socioeconomic factors may contribute to the cur-
rent incidence of infertility. Because of the women's movement
and the economy, many women now work and -thus postpone
having children until well beyond their most fertile years.3 7
Also, vast numbers of women currently in their thirties and
forties were born with malfunctioning reproductive systems
resulting from their mothers' use of the drug DES during the
1940s and 1950s.'38 Further, because the female reproductive
system is vulnerable to scarring resulting from sexually trans-
mitted diseases, the sexual revolution may have also contributed
to the current infertility rate.3 9
More recently, a previously unrecognized threat to human
132. Id. at 247.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 235.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 56. After age 35, the infertility rate in fe-
males increases significantly. The results of one study showed that for married
women between the ages of 25 and 34 there is an 11.1% infertility rate and for
women between the ages of 35 and 44 there is a 25.9% infertility rate. See YEH &
YEH, supra note 107, at 2. Moreover, in the older age group there are also higher
rates of chromosomal defects. Id. For instance, the risk of bearing a child with
Down's syndrome increases steadily as a woman ages. BELLINA & WILSON, supra
note 116, at 335. Women aged 25 to 30 experience from 2.1 to 2.6 incidences of
Down's syndrome per 1000 live births. Id. Between age 35 and 40, the rate rises to
15.8. Id.
138. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 56.
139. Id.
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fertility has been identified. Environmental groups and scien-
tists warn that chemical pollutants found in the air, water, and
soil, even in minuscule amounts, can interfere with human fer-
tility.40 Despite regulatory efforts, chemical compounds and
waste by-products of processes such as paper making and waste
incineration, continue to permeate the environment.14 ' Some
scientists believe that these compounds disrupt the hormonal ac-
tion necessary for successful human reproduction.""
No evidence exists to prove conclusively that these chemical
pollutants affect human fertility. The argument, however,
becomes more persuasive by examining evidence showing that
incidences of several hormone-related disorders, such as low
sperm counts and endometriosis, have risen since certain chemi-
cals were first used.' If no method can feasibly and complete-
ly rid the environment of these compounds and if they continue
to accumulate in the environment, infertility may become an
even more significant health issue in the future.
Treating Infertility
Of the millions of infertile couples in the United States, an
increasing number seek treatment.45 In 1988 alone, 1.4 mil-
lion women sought treatment for infertility.'46 The number of
clinics offering infertility services grew from thirty to 300 in the
last ten years, resulting in a $350 million a year business."
140. Michael D. Lemonick, Not So Fertile Ground: Some Scientists Fear That Pol-
lutants Are Damaging Human Reproductive Systems, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 68.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. (noting that "[tihe existing evidence is largely circumstantial").
144. See id. Additionally, studies conducted on various animal species resulted in
numerous reproductive dysfunctions, such as smaller sex organs, reduced sperm
counts, feminized sexual behavior, or inability to procreate. Id. at 69. Some of the
studies showed that even small amounts of the chemicals, particularly dioxin, caused
damage. Id. Dioxin is particularly hazardous because the body metabolizes it in
much the same way as natural chemicals, and it interacts with almost every hor-
mone system in the body. Id. at 69-70.
145. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 58. The number of couples seeking
treatment for fertility problems tripled from 1968 to 1984. Id.
146. Shannon Brownlee et al., The Baby Chase, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
5, 1994, at 84, 86.
147. Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limits, N.Y. TIIEs, Jan. 7,
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Conducting an evaluation to determine the cause of infertility
is the first step in its treatment. "8 The basic infertility evalua-
tion includes a complete history and physical examination of the
couple, semen analysis, and an evaluation of the woman's ovula-
tory and hormonal status.' Treatments vary depending on
the cause of infertility. To treat female infertility, scar tissue or
an obstruction can be removed surgically and various infertility
drugs can be administered to encourage ovulation.' Depend-
ing on the cause, male infertility is likewise treatable by surgery
or by drug therapy.'5 '
When treatment of the underlying cause of infertility fails,
assisted reproductive technology offers an infertile couple sever-
al options. Techniques such as artificial insemination (AI) and
in-vitro fertilization (IVF) have become increasingly popular.8 2
AI is a technique whereby semen, from either a woman's hus-
band (AIH) or an anonymous donor (AID), is placed in the cervi-
cal canal or uterus without sexual intercourse.'53 On the day of
ovulation or shortly before, AI is accomplished by using a small
plastic tube or syringe to implant the sperm.'"' AIH's most
common use occurs when a husband has an abnormal or low
sperm count.'55 A doctor can perform AIH or the couple can ac-
complish it in their own home.' 5 AID, the use of donor sperm,
employs the same implantation methods as AIH except that the
sperm is frozen from a sperm bank, rather than fresh from the
1996, at Al, A18.
148. BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 102-03.
149. YEH & YEH, supra note 107, at 7-8.
150. See BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 222-73.
151. Id. at 278-306.
152. See YEH & YEH, supra note 107, at 61. Births resulting from assisted re-
productive technologies increased sixfold from 1985 to 1990. Id. In 1988, just over
22,000 assisted reproductive cycles were initiated, id., compared with the 40,000 now
performed in a year, probably due to the rapid increase in the number of infertility
clinics. Gabriel, supra note 147, at A18.
153. BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 309. Although probably thought of as
a modern development, Al was first used in the 1600s but it was limited to use of
the husband's sperm. YEH & YEH, supra note 107, at 35. Perhaps because of the
moral debate, i.e., whether the woman had committed adultery, use of donor sperm
did not start until the 19th century. See id. at 34, 39.
154. BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 309-11.
155. Id. at 310-11.
156. Id.
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husband.'57 Pregnancy rates with AIH and AID correspond to
those of natural pregnancy.'58
Unlike AI, the IVF procedure involves fertilization of mature
eggs outside the uterus.'59 IVF involves removing mature eggs
from the ovaries, fertilizing them in a laboratory, and reinsert-
ing them into the uterus."6 IVF has been called a "test of hu-
man endurance"-especially for the woman.'6' As one woman
stated after completing her first IVF treatment, "[ylour whole
life is consumed by it."'62
Though IVF is conceptually simple, if a couple elects to use it,
the woman must be prepared to devote a substantial amount of
time to ensure its success. To prepare for the removal of mature
eggs, the woman receives injections of fertility drugs so that
multiple eggs mature in a single month, rather than the usual
one.'63 Medical personnel then administer daily blood tests and
ultrasound examinations to monitor the growth of the eggs.",
Timing is critical; the eggs must be removed at the precise mo-
ment when they are ready to be released from the ovary or else
removal will be impossible.'65 When the eggs are ready for re-
moval, a laparoscope is inserted through the woman's navel and
the mature eggs are suctioned from the ovary."
Once removed, each egg is placed in a culture dish and com-
bined with the husband's or donor's sperm.' After fertilization
occurs and the preembryos 68 have grown to either four or
eight cells, a number of them are transferred to the uterus.6 9
Upon completed transfer, the woman may require another
157. Id. at 312-14.
158. Id. at 309.
159. Id. at 366.
160. Id.
161. Thompson, supra note 36, at 79.
162. Caminiti, supra note 109, at 99.
163. See BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 368.
164. Id. at 368-69.
165. Id. at 369.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 369-70.
168. A "preembryo" is the fertilized egg prior to its fourteenth day of develop-
ment. Jean Voutsinas, In Vitro Fertilization, 12 PROB. L.J. 47, 50 (1994). After the
fourteenth day, the term "embryo" is used. Id.
169. BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 371.
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round of daily blood tests so that doctors can monitor various
hormone levels necessary to support a pregnancy.7 0 The time
following the IVF procedure is critical because it is during that
time the preembryo must attach to the uterine wall.' Thirty-
three percent of transferred preembryos spontaneously abort'72
and eighty to eighty-five percent of the preembryos, for reasons
only recently being understood, fail to implant in the uterus
wall.173
As is evident, selecting IVF as the answer to infertility is
time-consuming for the woman. If she works, she must spend a
considerable amount of time away from her job, in doctors' offic-
es and hospitals. Because the average success rate for IVF is
only 15.2% for a single IVF cycle or procedure,'74 many couples
undergo multiple IVF cycles in the hopes of conceiving a




173. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 61. As implantation does not always succeed,
multiple preembryos are fertilized and transferred to the uterus to increase the
chances of a live birth. See Voutsinas, supra note 168, at 49. Because the rate of
multiple deliveries increases with the number of preembryos transferred, however,
doctors must determine the optimal number to transfer. Id. Doctors freeze
("cryopreserve") any unused preembryos for future use. Id. Because preembryos can
be preserved for an estimated two to 600 years, Christine A. Djalleta, Comment, A
Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in
Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 335 (1994),
cryopreservation has led to a heated debate over whether preembryos should be
treated as a "person" or as "property." See, e.g., Voutsinas, supra note 168, at 79-81
(concluding that the preembryo should be treated as neither person nor property,
but, instead, should receive a special classification of its own).
Two new procedures have increased implantation rates, which may decrease the
need to remove and fertilize multiple eggs. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 61.
One procedure, gamete intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT), involves the injection of sperm
and mature eggs directly into the fallopian tube, allowing fertilization to occur as it
would naturally. Id. Another variation is zygote intra-fallopian transfer (ZIFT) where
the eggs are fertilized in a dish and then the preembryos, or zygotes, are placed di-
rectly into the fallopian tubes. Id. With ZIFT and GIFT, implantation rates have
doubled. Id.
174. Caminiti, supra note 109, at 103.
175. See, e.g., Brownlee et al., supra note 146, at 84, 89 (describing one couple's
seven-year attempt to conceive a child, including seven IVF attempts, and another
couple that underwent five IVF procedures); Caminiti, supra note 109, at 100 (de-
scribing a couple that underwent five cycles of artificial insemination and two 1VF
392
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Although modern technology offers potential solutions to infer-
tility, many couples simply cannot afford procedures such as
IVF. IVF can cost as much as $6000 to $14,000 per cycle.176
Because several attempts may be necessary to ensure success,
the ultimate cost can range from $50,000 to $100,000 per live
birth.77 Even more standard treatments can be expensive. AI
costs from $800 to $3000 per cycle. 78 An initial fertility evalu-
ation in a doctor's office can cost as much as $2000.179 Al-
though a number of states require insurers to cover fertility
treatments,8 ' some insurance companies in other states either
do not cover IVF or limit coverage to a single IVF cycle.' Be-
cause of the lack of insurance coverage, patients bear eighty-five
percent of the treatment costs.'82
procedures).
176. Hamilton, supra note 109, at 89.
177. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 36, at 58 (cost can surpass $50,000 per live
birth); Thompson, supra note 36, at 79 (standard IVF can cost more than $100,000).
178. Hamilton, supra note 109, at 89.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West Supp. 1996) (re-
quiring every health care service plan that covers hospital, medical or surgical ex-
penses on a group basis to offer coverage for infertility treatment); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 1995) (requiring insurance companies to offer entities
providing group hospital or medical insurance coverage for their employees a group
hospital or medical service plan providing "medically necessary expenses for the di-
agnosis and treatment of infertility"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/356m (Smith-
Hurd 1995) (requiring group accident or health insurance policies that provide cover-
age for more than 25 employees and provide pregnancy-related benefits to contain
coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
176A, § 8K (West Supp. 1995) (requiring any policy that provides pregnancy-related
benefits to also provide as a benefit for all subscribers, to the extent that benefits
are provided for other pregnancy-related procedures, "coverage for medically neces-
sary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-
30(a) (1994) ("Any health insurance contract, plan, or policy ... which includes
pregnancy related benefits, shall provide coverage for medically necessary expenses of
diagnosis and treatment of infertility.").
181. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West Supp. 1996) (ex-
cluding coverage for IVF); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (Supp.. 1992) (stating
that policies providing pregnancy-related benefits must include "a one-time only
benefit for all outpatient expenses arising from in vitro fertilization procedures," but
the couple must have a history of infertility of at least five years duration, or the
infertility must be caused by endometriosis, exposure to DES, blockage of fallopian
tubes, or abnormal male factors, and the couple must have tried other infertility
treatments prior to trying IVF.); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 354DD (1994) (listing
the same requirements as Hawaii).
182. Gabriel, supra note 147, at A18. Some large companies, both private and
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DIVERGENT VIEWS OF INFERTILITY AS A DISABILrrY UNDER THE
ADA: PACOUREK V. INLAND STEEL Co.'83 AND ZATARAIN V.
WDSU-TELEvIsIoN, INC.'8
Regardless of whether infertility is classified as a disease,
syndrome, or condition," it is nonetheless a physiological dis-
order affecting the reproductive system. Despite this fact, deter-
mining whether infertility qualifies as a "disability" under the
ADA depends upon the willingness of the courts to accept the
ADA's broad definition of that term." Pacourek and Zatarain
illustrate the divergent views that courts have taken on the
matter.
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.18 7
Factual Background
Charline Pacourek began working for Inland Steel in
1975." In 1986, she "was diagnosed with esphofical reflux, a
medical condition preventing her from becoming pregnant natu-
rally."5 9 She decided to undergo experimental infertility treat-
ment at the University of Chicago, becoming its first IVF pa-
tient."s In October 1986, she informed Inland of her efforts to
become pregnant. 9' Though the court's opinion does not detail
what transpired between 1986 and 1992, Ms. Pacourek alleged
that in 1992, an Inland manager, Thomas Wides, "verbally
abused [her] concerning her pregnancy related condition by
expressing doubt as to her ability to become pregnant and her
public, do, however, provide infertility coverage. A 1992 survey conducted by A. Fos-
ter Higgins & Co. showed that 34% of 1695 companies surveyed offered some type
of infertility coverage. Caminiti, supra note 109, at 103. These companies view infer-
tility as "something catastrophic that can seriously affect worker productivity... ." Id.
183. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
184. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
185. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
187. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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ability to combine pregnancy and her career."'92 She claimed
that she was "treated like she had an infectious disease" 93 and
that one top-level manager told her, "I don't give a damn about
the law. I only care about Inland Steel. If God had wanted you
to have children,... he would have given them to you.""
In March 1992, a manager told Ms. Pacourek that she was a
"high risk" and that it was "inevitable that she would be
terminated."95 After relaying the conversation to Inland's per-
sonnel manager, Ms. Pacourek was told that a letter from her
physician would "alleviate any problems."" She provided the
letter in July 1992.'
Though Ms. Pacourek missed twenty-six work-days in one
year, she claims that her work never suffered and that she got
approval for the absences, making up the missed days by work-
ing overtime. 9' Despite assurances from the personnel depart-
ment that she would not be fired," she was, indeed, terminat-
ed in June 1993.00 She sued under the ADA, claiming that In-
land discriminated against her because of a physical impairment
that substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction. °'
192. Id. at 1397.
193. Stanley Holmes, Efforts To Get Pregnant Led to Firing, Woman Says, BUFF.
NEWS, Apr. 3, 1994, at A10.
194. Id.
195. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1397.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Holmes, supra note 193, at A10.
199. Id.
200. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396.
201. Id. at 1404. Ms. Pacourek also alleged that her termination violated the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), id. at 1400, which prohibits discrimination on
the "basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(k), 2000e-2 (1994). Inland contended that the "inability to become pregnant" is
not a condition covered under the PDA. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1401. The court
rejected Inland's argument, finding that:
[iut makes sense to conclude that the PDA was intended to cover a
woman's intention or potential to become pregnant, because all that con-
clusion means is that discrimination against persons who intend to or
can potentially become pregnant is discrimination against women, which
is the kind of truism the PDA wrote into law.
Id. Moreover, as the PDA prohibits discrimination against a woman because she has
had an abortion, the court "could find no reason why [the scope of the PDA's protec-
tion, which included] termination of a pregnancy[,] would not also include the initia-
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Analysis of the ADA Claim
Moving to dismiss the ADA claim, Inland contended that Ms.
Pacourek's alleged impairment, esphofical reflux, was not a dis-
ability under the ADA." 2 After analyzing the three definitional
prongs of an ADA disability,0 ' the court concluded that Ms.
Pacourek was disabled as defined by the ADA.2 Though the
court only briefly discussed the ADA claim, its logic was clear.
First, the court looked at whether esphofical reflux was an
impairment under the ADA."5 Because the reproductive sys-
tem was specifically listed as one of the systems that a physio-
logical disorder may affect, the court easily concluded that Ms.
Pacourek's condition was an impairment.2 6 In fact, Inland did
not dispute whether Ms. Pacourek's condition was an impair-
ment as that term is defined under the ADA.07
Second, the court considered whether reproduction was a "ma-
jor life activity" under the ADA.0 8 The court gave two reasons
for its conclusion that reproduction qualified as a major life
activity.2 9 Although reproduction was not expressly listed as a
major life activity in the EEOC regulations, the court did not
believe that the reproductive system could be the subject of an
impairment without reproduction correspondingly being consid-
ered a major life activity.210 The court reasoned that because
an asserted physical impairment could be one of the reproduc-
tive system, "it logically follow[ed]" that reproduction was a
major life activity.21' The court's second reason was based on
dicta found in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case of
McWright v. Alexander.212
In McWright, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Rehabilitation
tion of a pregnancy." Id. at 1403.
202. Id. at 1397, 1404.
203. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
204. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1404-05.
205. Id. at 1404.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1404-05.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1404.
211. Id.
212. 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Act provisions, substantially identical to the ADA, prohibiting
employment discrimination by federal agencies "on the basis of
handicap."213 McWright, an employee of the Department of En-
ergy (DOE), alleged that the department discriminated against
her because of her handicap-sterility.214 She specifically al-
leged that the DOE failed to reasonably accommodate her handi-
cap by denying her leave to care for her newly adopted child.2"5
The DOE did not dispute that McWright was handi-
capped,2"' but the court noted that among the "protected class
of handicapped individuals [is a] person with a physiological
disorder affecting the reproductive system."217 Because the Re-
habilitation Act's definition of "handicapped" and the ADA's def-
inition of "disability" were substantially identical, Pacourek
found McWright apposite and supportive of its finding that re-
production is a major life activity.218
The last prong of the disability definitional requirement ad
dressed by the court was whether the impairment substantially
limited a major life .activity.2 9 The court, again, found little
difficulty in answering the question affirmatively.22 It held
that "[t]he conclusion that infertility substantially limits the
major life activity [of reproduction] is a matter of common
sense."221 Under the ADA, EEOC regulations specifically define
"substantially limits" as a significant restriction in the manner
in which a major life activity is performed as compared to an
average person. 2 Because Ms. Pacourek could not have a
child naturally, she was significantly restricted in the manner in
213. Id. at 225-26. The applicable Rehabilitation Act provision read: "No otherwise
qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
. " 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988). This section has since been amended replacing the
term "handicaps" with "disability." See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
214. McWright, 982 F.2d at 227.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 226.
217. Id. at 226-27.
218. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
219. Id. at 1405.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995).
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which she could procreate as compared to the average person in
the general population.2" Thus, her impairment substantially
limited the major life activity of reproduction."
Pacourek demonstrates the manner in which a court may
broadly construe the ADA disability definition. Determining
whether infertility is a disability under the ADA rests simply
upon deciding whether reproduction is a major life activity. Al-
though EEOC regulations do not list reproduction as a major life
activity, the EEOC has expressly stated that the list of major
life activities is merely representative and not exhaustive.225
Despite the need to retain flexibility under the ADA, however,
the outcome of a plaintiffs claim under that Act depends on a
court's willingness to recognize that the ADA's broad language
encompasses nontraditional disabilities such as infertility. The
case of Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc. 26 illustrates a nar-
rower interpretation.
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc.2"
Factual Background
From 1983 to November 1992, WDSU employed Lynn Gansar
Zatarain as a reporter and anchor person. 8 Beginning in Au-
gust or September 1990, Ms. Zatarain was the only anchor person
for three evening newscasts at 5:00 p.m., 6:00 p.m., and 10:00
p.m. 9 She worked approximately eight hours a day, arriving at
work at 3:00 p.m. and leaving sometime after 10:00 p.m."0
In July 1992, Ms. Zatarain began receiving fertility treat-
ments, which consisted of hormone shots given between 4:00 and
6:00 p.m. daily. 1 She informed WDSU of her efforts to become
pregnant and WDSU management allowed her to report for
223. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1405.
224. Id.
225. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995); EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 85,
at 902-15.
226. 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 241.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 241-42.
231. Id.
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work later than her usual 3:00 p.m. arrival time so that she
could receive the necessary hormone shots. 2
In November 1992, Ms. Zatarain informed WDSU that her
doctor recommended a reduced work schedule during the time
she was to receive fertility treatments."3 She requested that
WDSU modify her schedule so that she could do the 6:00 p.m.
newscast, then go home and return to work in time to do the
10:00 p.m. newscast.' Ms. Zatarain requested that she be al-
lowed to work this reduced schedule for a four-month period." 5
She also offered to do a series of special reports on infertility.1
6
WDSU did not agree to the arrangement proposed by Ms.
Zatarain and did not renew her personal services contract,
which had expired the previous month. 7 Ms. Zatarain brought
suit against WDSU alleging that her discharge violated the
ADAY8 As in Pacourek, the defendant claimed that infertility
or a reproductive disorder did not qualify as a disability under
the ADA. 9
Analysis of the ADA Claim
The court began its analysis of Zatarain's claim by examining
the impairment prong of the ADA disability definition.24 ° In its
effort to show that Ms. Zatarain did not have a physiological
impairment, WDSU argued that Ms. Zatarain's condition merely
implicated stress or age." They asserted that neither job-re-
lated stress nor age is a physiological impairment; therefore Ms.
Zatarain was not disabled. 2 The court rejected WDSU's asser-








240. Id. at 242-43.
241. Id. at 242. Ms. Zatarain was nearly 40 years old when she began the fertili-
ty treatments. Id. at 242 n.1. Her doctor testified during a deposition that her "'bio-
logical clock had almost ticked'." Id.
242. Id. at 243. WDSU relied on EEOC regulations stating that advanced age is
not in itself an impairment and that general stress relating to a job or personal life
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tion, instead accepting Ms. Zatarain's doctor's testimony that
although the exact cause of her infertility was unknown, Ms.
Zatarain suffered from a "disorder of the reproductive sys-
tem.., separate and apart from age and stress." 3 Ms.
Zatarain thus met the ADA definition of impairment.2"
The court next examined whether Ms. Zatarain's impairment
substantially limited a major life activity. 5 Ms. Zatarain relied
on Pacourek and asserted that reproduction is a major life activi-
ty.24 The court, however, did not find Pacourek dispositive. 4
In declining to classify reproduction as a major life activity,
the court reasoned that a "major life activity ... [must be] sepa-
rate and distinct from the impairment that limits it. Plaintiff's
construction is faulty because it would allow her to bootstrap a
finding of substantial limitation of a major life activity on to a
finding of an impairment.... This analysis is circular and un-
persuasive."2" Additionally, the court reasoned that consider-
ing reproduction to be a major life activity was "inconsistent
with the illustrative list of major life activities provided in the
ADA regulatibns... [as] [r]eproduction is not an activity en-
gaged in with the same degree of frequency as the listed activi-
ties of walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing." 9 Though a person is "required to walk, see, learn, speak,
breath [sic], and work throughout the day, day in and day
out... [a] person is not called upon to reproduce throughout the
day, every day."'50 Therefore, based on a review of the illustra-
tive list of major life activities, the court concluded that finding
reproduction to be a major life activity would be a "conscious
expansion of the law."" 1 After concluding that the major life
activity of working was not substantially limited by her infertili-
pressures is also not an impairment. See id. at 242-43, nn.1-2.
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ty, the court dismissed Ms. Zatarain's ADA claim.2
RECOGNITION OF INFERTILITY AS A DISABILITY
In light of the conflicting decisions of Zatarain and Pacourek,
it is impossible to predict on which side of the infertility-disabili-
ty question the next case may fall.Y As the incidence of infer-
tility increases and new reproductive technology affords increas-
ing numbers of infertile couples the opportunity to conceive
children, the EEOC must issue definitive guidance. Without that
guidance, employees will be at the mercy of unpredictable courts
attempting to restrict the broad language of the ADA to preclude
nontraditional disabilities such as infertility. Moreover, employ-
ers will be forced to litigate claims in order to determine the
nature of their responsibilities under the ADA.
When formulating guidance to address these concerns, the
EEOC should reject Zatarain's finding that reproduction is not a
major life activity. The rejection would be supportable given that
Zatarain ignored crucial aspects of the ADA regulations, inter-
pretive guidelines issued by the EEOC, the legislative history of
the ADA, and precedent under analogous provisions of the Reha-
bilitation Act. Zatarain likewise ignored the importance of pro-
creation in our society when it interpreted the major life activity
prong.
The ADA Regulations and Reproduction As a Major Life Activity
In holding that reproduction is not a major life activity, and
thus that infertility is not a disability, Zatarain overlooked
252. See id. at 243-45.
253. Several months after Zatarain, two courts again split on the issue of
whether infertility qualifies as a disability under the ADA. Compare Erickson v.
Northeastern Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995) with Krauel v. Iowa Meth-
odist Medical Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995). Krauel, relying on Zatarain,
refused to recognize reproduction as a major life activity. See Krauel, 915 F. Supp.
at 108. The court distinguished reproduction from the listed major life activities be-
cause reproduction is a lifestyle choice]." Id. at 106. The court supported its hold-
ing with the statement: "Some people choose not to have children, but all peo-
ple . . . walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, learn, and work . . . ." Id. at 106 n.1. Con-
versely, the court in Erickson held that reproduction is a major life activity under
the ADA, rejecting Zatarain's analysis. See Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 323.
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crucial aspects of the ADA regulations and of EEOC interpretive
guidelines. First, Zatarain criticized as "circular" the argument
that an impairment to the reproductive system could
"substantially limit" the major life activity of reproduction.2"
The court reasoned that "the structure of the ADA and its regu-
lations indicate that the major life activity... allegedly limited
is separate and distinct from the impairment that limits it." 5
Contrary to the court's observation, however, two elementary
examples suggest that an impairment and a major life activity
need not be separate and distinct. For example, a person who
has a hearing impairment may be substantially limited in the
major life activity of hearing. Additionally, a person who has a
vision impairment may be substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing. In both instances the impairment and the
major life activity are inseparable. Nevertheless, depending on
the severity of the impairment, both are recognized disabilities
under the ADA."'
Moreover, the EEOC has implicitly endorsed "circular analy-
sis." In its March 1995 Compliance Manual, used by the EEOC
when investigating charges of discrimination under the ADA,
the EEOC noted: "There has been little controversy about what
constitutes a major life activity. In most cases, courts have sim-
ply stated that an impaired activity is a major life activity."257
Given this statement, the EEOC could easily reject Zatarain's
criticism. A reproductive disorder is 'not required to impair an
activity other than the major life activity of reproduction. In-
deed, Pacourek25 may have appropriately concluded that if re-
production were not a major life activity, "it would have made no
sense to include the reproductive system among the systems
that can have an ADA physical impairment."259
254. Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Sawinski v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (holding that a deaf employee was disabled under the ADA); Galloway v.
Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 19 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that excluding blind per-
sons from a jury violated the ADA).
257. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 86, at 902-14.
258. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
259. Id. at 1404.
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The second reason Zatarain rejected reproduction as a major
life activity was because the court found that reproduction was
inconsistent with the illustrative list of activities because it was
an activity occurring with less frequency than walking, seeing,
or breathing."' Neither the ADA nor the EEOC regulations,
however, expressly or implicitly require that a major life activity
be engaged in with any degree of frequency.26' Nevertheless,
even if frequency were a touchstone, viewing reproduction as a
continual process involving complex biological processes, rather
than viewing it as the single act of conception, would satisfy
Zatarain's "frequency" requirement.262 In the female reproduc-
tive system, hundreds of eggs mature each month in response to
complex hormonal signals from the brain, and in the male repro-
ductive system, millions of sperm are produced every day.2"
Both processes are continual; thus the process of reproduction is
engaged in on a daily basis.
Although Zatarain examined the illustrative list of major life
activities to support its reasoning, it did not review the specific
exclusions under the ADA. Had the court chosen to do so, it
could have concluded that infertility was inconsistent with those
excluded conditions.
In excluding conditions such as homosexuality, bisexuality,
transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeur-
ism, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and pyromania from the
definition of disability,2" Congress was concerned that the
ADA would protect individuals from discrimination on the basis
260. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D. La. 1995)
affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 16302(i) (1995).
262. In finding that reproduction is a major life activity, at least two courts have
refused to view reproduction in this narrow sense. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.
Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995) (limiting reproduction to conception ignores the "pro-
cess of raising and caring for offspring upon which successful reproduction depends");
Erickson v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 322 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (reasoning
that Zatarain's view ignores the "processes that occur continually in both male and
female reproductive systems in order to achieve conception"). The medical definition
contemplates a much broader view of reproduction as well. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DIcTIONARY 1344 (25th ed. 1990) (defining reproduction as the "total process" by
which organisms produce offspring).
263. See BELLINA & WILSON, supra note 116, at 33-34, 63.
264. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12208, 12211 (1994).
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of a variety of socially unacceptable, immoral, and often illegal
behaviors." Infertility does not call into question any of these
concerns. Recognizing reproduction as a major life activity thus
would not undermine Congress's intent to disallow conditions
that are socially, morally, or legally unacceptable.
Legislative History and Judicial Interpretation of Reproduction
As a Major Life Activity Under the ADA
Notwithstanding the fact that reference to the statutory provi-
sions and administrative guidance undermine support of
Zatarain's arguments, the court additionally failed to consider
the legislative history of the ADA. Although using legislative
history as an interpretive tool has been criticized,2" the Su-
preme Court continues to rely on legislative history to guide its
statutory analysis. 67
A review of the legislative history of the ADA reveals some
discussion of reproduction, or, more specifically, procreation, as a
major life activity. The references arise in those instances in
265. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Rudman):
[We are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and
which individuals are engaging in of their own volition, admittedly for
reasons we do not fully understand. Where we as a people have through
a variety of means, including our legal code, expressed disapproval of
certain conduct, I do not understand how Congress can create the possi-
bility that employers are legally liable for taking such conduct into ac-
count when making employment-related decisions.
266. See, e.g., Peter H. Carroll III, Literalism, The United States Supreme Court's
Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143
(1993) (discussing the Court's abandonment of legislative history and policy in dis-
cerning the meaning of a statute); Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legisla-
tive History: Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PUB. IN-
TEREST L. REV. 57, 58 (concluding that the Supreme Court has become increasingly
reluctant to "stray from statutory text"); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of
Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992)
(detailing Justice Scalia's text-based approach to statutory interpretation and dis-
cussing decisions in which the Court applied this approach).
267. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or.,
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416-18 (1995) (considering the legislative history of the Endan-
gered Species Act); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1072-74 (1995) (consid-
ering the legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933).
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which Congress debated whether AIDS or HIV infection was a
disability under the ADA." Though analogizing infertility to a
fatal disease is pointless, the importance of the debate lies with
the interpretation of "major life activity" given by Congress in
concluding that AIDS or HIV infection is a disability.
After debating the issue, Congress concluded that AIDS or
HIV infection is covered under the ADA.269 As part of the ADA
legislative history, a House Education and Labor Committee
Report specifically states that HIV infection is an ADA disability
because of a "substantial limitation to procreation and intimate
sexual relationships."27 The Report also cites a memorandum
issued by the Department of Justice regarding the applicability
of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-infected individuals.2 ' In
part, that memorandum provides:
[It is reasonable to conclude that the life activity of procre-
ation-the fulfillment of the desire to conceive and bear
healthy children-is substantially limited for an
asymptomatic HIV-infected individual ... . HIV-infected
individuals cannot, whether they are male or female, engage
in the act of procreation with the normal expectation of
bringing forth a healthy child. Because of the infection in
their system, they will be unable to fulfill this basic human
desire. There is little doubt that procreation is a major life
activity .. 2"
268. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 485, supra note 20, at 52, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 334; 136 CONG. REC. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Owens); id. at H4626 (statement of Rep. Waxman).
269. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20, at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 334 (stating that a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is
covered under the definition of the term "disability"); 136 CONG. REc. H4623, supra
note 268 (statement of Rep. Owens) ("People with HIV disease are individuals who
have any condition along the full spectrum of HIV infection-asymptomatic HIV in-
fection, symptomatic HIV infection or full blown AIDS. These individuals are covered
under the definition of disability in the ADA"); id. at H4626 (statement of Rep.
Waxman) ("[Tihere exists a continuum of disease among those who are HIV infected.
All such individuals are covered under the . .. definition of disability in the ADA.").
270. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20 at 52, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
334 (emphasis added).
271. Id.
272. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 347-48 (1989) (emphasis added).
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The EEOC cites this same memorandum with approval in its
Compliance Manual."' Though some may consider legislative
history suspect, the interpretation given by the agency charged
with administering a statute must receive "substantial defer-
ence."274 Thus, a determination that reproduction is a major
life activity coincides with both the legislative history of the
ADA and the EEOC's own interpretation of "major life activity."
In addition to the legislative history, the limited case law
construing "major life activity" as it applies to the ADA also
coincides with a finding that reproduction or procreation is a
major life activity. The case of Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf,
P.C.275 is illustrative.
In Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., an HIV-infected attorney brought
an ADA action against his employer alleging that he was termi-
nated because of his infection."' Defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs condition was not
"disabling."277 Plaintiff argued that the ability to procreate
without uninfected progeny was a major life activity under the
ADA, thus bringing him within the protection of the statute.7 8
Defendants argued that to find that HIV qualified as a condition
covered under the ADA would "stretch the language and the
purpose of the statute beyond the breaking point."27 9 Quite
simply, the plaintiff was not "hired to practice procreation."280
After concluding that the plaintiff suffered from an "impair-
ment" because HIV is a disorder which affects the hemic and
lymphatic systems, the court examined the "major life activity"
requirement. 8' The court focused primarily on whether the ac-
tivity affected must be one associated with work. In that re-
gard, the court deemed it "significant that the Congress chose to
273. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 86, at 902-14 n.18.
274. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994).
275. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
276. Id. at 1313.
277. Id. at 1318.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1319.
280. Id. at 1318.
281. Id. at 1319-20.
282. Id. at 1320.
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use the broad term 'life,' as in: 'major life activities,'" rather than
"work" or "work-life."2" Because the statute chose the term
"major life activity" rather than "major work activity," the court
concluded that the argument that plaintiffs HIV status did not
affect his ability to perform his work was without merit.&
4
Simply put, "the language of the statute does not preclude pro-
creating as a major life activity."'
In the more recent case of Abbott v. Bragdon,86 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Maine considered the question
of whether HIV is a disability under Title III (public accommo-
dations and services) of the ADA. 7 In Abbott, the plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant, a dentist, refused to treat her because
she was HIV-positive.2" She asserted that reproduction was
the sole activity limited in that the "risk of transmitting HIV to
a potential child... deterred her from having children."89 On
a motion for summary judgment, the defendant disputed that
asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the ADA.Y Conclud-
ing that the plaintiff was disabled as a matter of law, the court
found Zatarain unpersuasive. 9'
Specifically, the court agreed with Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C.,
deeming it significant that Congress chose the term "major life
activities" rather than a more limited term.Y The court also
found that the "broad language" of the ADA and the interpreta-
tive guidelines illustrated that the major life activities were not
limited to those listed.9 Moreover, the court noted that the
"interests in conceiving and raising one's own children have been
recognized as essential and basic civil liberties"" and that re-
production is "one of the most fundamental of human activi-
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. Id.
"285. Id.
286. 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
287. Id.
288. See id. at 583-84.
289. Id. at 586.
290. Id. at 584.
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ties."29" The court thus concluded that reproduction qualified
as a major life activity under the ADA.29
As the legislative history, Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., and Abbott
reveal, restrictively interpreting "major life activity" is not sup-
portable. If Congress intended to recognize reproduction as a
"major life activity" solely for the purpose of recognizing AIDS as
a disability, it would have said so. Cases decided under analo-
gous provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are likewise
inconsistent with such a restrictive approach.
"Major Life Activity" Under the Rehabilitation Act
For purposes of interpreting the term "disability" under the
ADA, Congress intended that cases decided under analogous
provisions of the Rehabilitation Act provide guidance.297 Specif-
ically, in discussing the definition of "major life activities" under
the ADA, EEOC regulations provide that "[tihis term adopts the
definition of the term 'major life activities,' found in the regula-
tions implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act .... ,298 If the Rehabilitation Act recognized reproduction
as a "major life activity," that term must likewise qualify as a
"major life activity" under the ADA. The early AIDS discrimina-
tion cases, again, are instructive; they demonstrate a consensus
that reproduction or procreation is a major life activity.
In Doe v. Dolton Elementa7y School District No. 148,99 the
parents of a child infected with HIV brought an action against
the school district seeking a preliminary injunction requiring the
school to permit the child to attend regular classes."° In grant-
ing injunctive relief, the court gave an expansive reading to the
term "major life activity":
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 20, at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 332 ("It is the Committee's intent that the analysis of the term 'individual with
handicaps' by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the regulations
implementing section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] .. . apply to the definition of
the term 'disability' included in this legislation.").
298. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995).
299. 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
300. Id. at 442.
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[The child's] physiological disorders substantially limit [his]
major life activities .... His involvement in contact sports is
limited to that of an observer, forcing him to sit On'the side
while his classmates engage in these activities. Also, he may
not engage in reproductive functions without endangering the
lives of others. While [he] may not yet be of an age where
such activity is appropriate, the mere prospect of such a
limitation is certain to restrict social interaction with those of
the opposite sex.s'm
In the factually similar case of Thomas v. Atascadero Unified
School District,32 the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California granted a permanent injunction against a
school district that wanted to prevent a young HIV-infected child
from attending kindergarten classes."' Though the child was
too young to engage in sexual activity, the court reasoned: "Per-
sons infected with the AIDS virus suffer significant impairments
of their major life activities .... Even those who are asymptom-
atic have abnormalities... making procreation and childbirth
dangerous to themselves and others. " "' Thus, the court con-
cluded that the child was a handicapped individual and was,
therefore, protected by the Rehabilitation Act."5
In Doe v. District of Columbia,"6 a more recent case in ac-
cord with the others, the plaintiff was HIV-positive and alleged
that the District of Columbia violated the Rehabilitation Act by
withdrawing an offer of employment when it learned of his HIV-
positive status."0 7 The District of Columbia did not dispute that
Doe was an individual with a handicap, and the court held that
Doe's physical impairment substantially limited the major life
activities of "procreation, sexual contact, and normal social rela-
tionships."M3 These cases demonstrate with unanimity that
301. Id. at 445.
302. 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
303. Id. at 381-82.
304. Id. at 379.
305. Id. at 381.
306. 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992).
307. Id. at 569.
308. Id. at 568. The holding was cited with approval in a magistrate's report and
recommendation two years later in the same district. See Liff v. Secretary of
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reproduction is a major life activity under the Rehabilitation
Act. In holding that reproduction is not a major life activity
under the ADA, Zatarain ignored the congressional and EEOC
mandates that the Rehabilitation Act and any cases interpreting
its provisions be used as interpretative tools under the ADA.
Once more, the EEOC could easily reject Zatarain's restrictive
interpretation of major life activity.
Supreme Court and Congressional Recognition of "Reproductive
Rights"
As demonstrated, Zatarain's rejection of reproduction as a
major life activity is questionable based on the legislative history
of the ADA, statutory provisions, and EEOC interpretive guide-
lines. The Court's rejection is equally unfounded given judicial
and congressional recognition of an individual's right to conceive
children."0 9 Procreation, unlike the recognized major life activi-
ties such as performing manual tasks, sitting, or standing, is one
of constitutional import and given statutory protection. 0
Beginning with Skinner v. Oklahoma,"1 ' the Supreme Court
has held, in a number of settings, that what may be broadly
termed "reproductive rights" are protected by the Constitution.
In Skinner, the Court held that an Oklahoma statute permitting
sterilization of those individuals who were convicted of larceny
but not those convicted of embezzlement violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 12 Justice Douglas wrote: "This case touches
a[n] ... important area of human rights. Oklahoma deprives
certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation
Transp., No. CIV.A.93-0118 TFH/DAR, 1994 WL 579912, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 22,
1994) (stating that "this court has expressly held that 'major life activities' include
such non-work related activities as 'procreation, sexual contact, and normal social
relationships'") (citing Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C.
1992)). The magistrate's report subsequently was adopted by the district court. See
Liff v. Secretary of Transp., No. CIV. 93-0118 TFHDAR, 1995 WL 231246, at *1
(D.D.C. Feb. 21, 1995).
309. See supra notes 275-96 and accompanying text.
310. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Me. 1995) (holding that
reproduction constitutes a major life activity under the ADA); Erickson v. Northeast-
ern Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding the same).
311. 316 U.S. 535 (1941).
312. Id. at 541-43.
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of a race-the right to have offspring."'13
Almost thirty years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,314 the
Court struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the sale
of contraceptives to single persons.315 Writing for the Court,
Justice Brennan stated: "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child."3 16
Two recent cases also emphasize the importance of "reproduc-
tive rights." In Hodgson v. Minnesota,317 the Court held that a
Minnesota statute requiring parental notification of a minor's
abortion decision was unconstitutional. 31" The importance of
procreative liberty is evidenced by two statements written by
Justice Kennedy: "A woman's decision to conceive or to bear a
child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the...
Constitution."319 "The rights to conceive and to raise one's chil-
dren have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,'
and, '[rights far more precious.., than property rights." 2 °
More recently, in Casey v. Planned Parenthood,2' the Court
reiterated: "[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to person-
al decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education."322
In addition to the constitutional mandate prohibiting govern-
ment infringement upon this right, the trend has been to enact
legislation recognizing certain "reproductive rights" as well. In
1978, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act"2
313. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
314. 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
315. Id. at 446-52.
316. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
317. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
318. Id. at 423.
319. Id. at 434.
320. Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
321. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
322. Id. at 851 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
323. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)). This section provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
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(PDA) in response to a Supreme Court decision" 4 holding that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,s3 prohibiting sex dis-
crimination in employment, did not ban pregnancy discrimina-
tion .3 " The PDA effectively recognized that a woman has a
right to reproduce. The statute ensured that exercising that
right cannot form the basis of discriminatory employment prac-
tices.3 27
The Family and Medical Leave Act enacted by Congress in
1993 demonstrates a similar understanding. 8s Finding that
"the lack of employment policies to accommodate working par-
ents can force individuals to choose between job security and
parenting,"329 Congress mandated that employers allow eligible
employees leave from work to care for a newborn child.33  This
mandate inherently recognizes certain "reproductive
rights"--such as an individual's rights to conceive a child and to
raise a family.
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not require an
employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abor-
tion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from
providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in
regard to abortion.
42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1994).
324. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17.
326. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
327. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
328. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§
60m, 60n; 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 6381-6387; 40 U.S.C. § 166b-7; and scattered sections of
29 U.S.C. (1994)).
329. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3) (1994).
330. Id. § 2612 (a)(1)(A)-(C). An "eligible employee" is an employee who has
worked for the employer for at least 12 months, giving at least 1250 hours of ser-
vice to the employer during the previous 12-month period. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(i)-(ii). An
"eligible employee" does not include "any employee of an employer who is employed
at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total
number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is
less than 50." Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
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Although none of these statutory provisions or cases specifical-
ly address the right of infertile couples to reproduce, at bottom
they embrace one undeniable principle: reproduction is a funda-
mental human right. As at least one court has explained, "[ilt
takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of con-
stitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have
access to contraceptives, there must be included ... the right to
submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather
than prevent, pregnancy."
331
To find that reproduction cannot be a major life activity,
though it warrants constitutional and statutory protection, is
disingenuous. Recognition of reproduction as a major life activity
would properly invoke the Supreme Court's and Congress's tra-
ditional recognition of reproduction as a fundamental right.
Zatarain was short-sighted in its failure to do so. Moreover,
finding that reproduction is not a major life activity creates a
chilling effect on an infertile woman's right to bear a child.
Faced with the prospect of being fired from her job, a woman
may forego the opportunity that modern technology offers her.
Recognizing that reproduction is a major life activity under the
ADA gives substance to an infertile woman's right to reproduce.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the ADA to protect millions of disabled
persons from discrimination. Congress explicitly refused to adopt
a definitive listing of disabilities, implicitly acknowledging that
the term "disability" could be broadly construed to encompass
either new or nontraditional disabilities. 332 Although the
EEOC has identified infertility as one of the "tough issues" un-
der the ADA,333 Zatarain's restrictive analysis is insupportable.
Specifically, Zatarain's elimination of reproduction as a "major
331. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
332. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text; see also School Bd. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 280 n.5 (1987) (noting that the definition of disability under the Reha-
bilitation Act is a "broad definition, one not limited to so-called 'traditional handi-
caps'.") (citation omitted).
333. Key Disability Interpretations Await Confirmation of Three EEOC Commis-
sioners, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at D13 (Sept. 30, 1994), available in LEXIS,
Employ Library, Dlabrt File.
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life activity" is inconsistent with a reasoned interpretation of the
ADA and its implementing regulations. Although reproduction is
not expressly listed as a major life activity in the regulations,
this absence does not mean that reproduction cannot, in fact,
qualify as a major life activity under the ADA. The list of major
life activities is merely illustrative, not exhaustive."
Moreover, frequency cannot be the touchstone for finding that
an activity is a major life activity and, even assuming that it
were, viewing reproduction as a continual process rather than
the single act of conception satisfies this requirement. Addition-
ally, requiring the major life activity and impairment to be sepa-
rate and distinct means that persons who are blind or deaf
would be excluded from the ADA's protection, a result that un-
doubtedly is at odds with what Congress intended when it enact-
ed the ADA.
Zatarain's holding likewise ignores the legislative history of
the ADA and Congress's finding that reproduction is a major life
activity for those infected with HIV. Cases such as Doe v. Kohn
Nast & Graf, P.C."3 5 and Abbott v. Bragdon3 6 coincide with
Congress's intent, and emphasize the fact that Congress chose
the broad term major "life" activity.
Rejecting reproduction as a major life activity also runs con-
trary to the majority of courts that have addressed the issue
under the Rehabilitation Act.37 Again, in the HIV context,
courts have construed broadly the term major life activity to
encompass activities such as "reproductive functions,"338
"procreation and childbirth," '39 and "sexual contact and normal
social relationships."34 Zatarain's failure to recognize this view
is contrary to Congress's express mandate that the Rehabilita-
tion Act provisions guide courts in their interpretations of the
334. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995).
335. 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
336. 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
337. See supra notes 299-308 and accompanying text.
338. Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D.
Ill. 1988).
339. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal.
.1987).
340. Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 568 (D.D.C. 1992).
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ADA requirements.
Perhaps more importantly, Zatarain's conclusion that repro-
duction is not a major life activity runs contrary to the long-
standing acceptance of reproduction as a fundamental human
right." 1 The Supreme Court and Congress have both recog-
nized the importance of reproduction in people's lives." In
Zatarain, .the court frustrated the achievement of those rights
for those who suffer from infertility, yet wish to bear children
and maintain a career.
Infertility touches the lives of millions of couples. For those
who are in the work force, the words "'[i]f God had wanted you
to have children,... he would have given them to you"'343 are
insensitive and callous. They are not, however, illegal. On the
other hand, if an employer refuses to modify a work schedule or
allow an employee time away from work, or if the employer
terminates the employee or caps insurance benefit plans for
infertility treatment while providing unlimited coverage for
other conditions, the ADA protects the employee.
To prevent such divergent views as Pacourek and Zatarain,
the EEOC must issue administrative guidelines. By adopting
Pacourek's holding and the case law developed under the Reha-
bilitation Act, the EEOC would send a message that the lay
opinion of a "disability" cannot be the touchstone for courts in-
terpreting the ADA. In short, a "disability" under the ADA is
what Congress has said it is-a broadly defined statutory re-
quirement transcending the lay view of a disability and encom-
passing nontraditionMl disabilities such as infertility.
Deborah K Dallmann
341. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (listing personal
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1971) (holding that the right of privacy includes the right to make decisions
concerning procreation free of governmental interference); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541-42 (1941) (holding that procreation is "a fundamental right").
342. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438; Skinner 316 U.S. 595;
supra notes 270-96 and accompanying text.
343. Holmes, supra note 193, at A10 (quoting remarks allegedly made by a man-
ager at Inland Steel to Charline Pacourek).
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